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ABSTRACT 
The conflict between the income based and nutrition based estimates of poverty is a widely 
debated issue in economic literature. This paper, using a two commodity framework, attempts 
to show that in presence of inequality, a status driven utility function can reconcile the 
conflict between the two measures of poverty. In addition, a simple general equilibrium 
model using such a utility function is constructed to analyse the implications of social 
inequality on relative prices and the emerging pattern of trade.  
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Status, Poverty and Trade 
1. Introduction 
A fundamental query involving the preference pattern of any individual in a society has to 
deal with the social influence on individual consumption behaviour. The idea of conspicuous 
consumption and the so-called Veblen effect (Veblen, 1899) are quite well known in 
economics. Very recently Sivanathan and Pettit (2010) have confirmed the fact that 
individuals are quite sensitive to their relative status and would like to “mend” their “self” 
under constant attack from various social pressures by taking recourse to status signalling 
consumption behaviour. A series of experiments confirm such a pattern of human behaviour. 
This is one of the building blocks of the utility function that we use in the subsequent 
analysis. 
The paper starts off by highlighting a well observed empirical phenomenon discussed 
extensively in the literature on poverty in India. In this context Patnaik (2007) and Deaton 
and Dreze (2009) have discussed about the conflict between income-based measure and 
nutrition-based measure of poverty. In India people moving above the poverty line with 
greater monthly expenditure on overall consumption demonstrates lower nutritional intake. 
Thus Patnaik (2007) asserts that actual poverty estimate is far greater that the optimistic 
figure provided by the Government. While Deaton and Dreze (2009) analyze various reasons 
for such behaviour, not much emphasis is given to the role of status driven consumption 
pattern, although they do not ignore such a possibility. That social inequality can influence 
individual’s consumption and induce greater consumption of the so called status good, 
becomes quite relevant for such analysis. Reflecting on this phenomenon, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2007) have emphasized the puzzling consumption behaviour of the poor. Reporting on 
various country studies, they find that the poor in general spend more on “entertainment” 
rather than on “food” and conclude that the primary reason behind such a consumption 
pattern perhaps is that the poor have to “keep up with their neighbours”. Fafchamps and 
Shilpi (2008) have also demonstrated how the presence of richer persons in a community 
affects the well being of the individuals. Such perceptions coupled with the status driven 
consumption behaviour can lead to a bias towards consumption of the status good. However, 
thematically the relation between social inequality and consumption behaviour of the poor is 
undermined and under-explored in the poverty literature. We shall demonstrate how pre-
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existing social inequality influence social choices of the poor and how this in turn can lead to 
the conflicting measures of poverty as highlighted in previous literature. 
Another objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of income distribution on relative 
price of food or what we call the nutrition or necessary good. This analysis is carried out 
primarily for the purpose of exploring the pattern of trade that might emerge between two 
economies with different levels of social inequality. Towards this end, a general equilibrium 
analysis, as an extension to our main model, is carried out. Essentially, we intend to integrate 
models capturing influence of inequality on consumer preferences with traditional theory of 
competition and pure exchange in markets. 
One must mention that over the last few years a voluminous literature discussed the impact of 
social status and relative income on conspicuous consumption
1
. Also there is a related body 
of literature that analyze the linkages between relative status and “happiness” as surveyed by 
Clark et al. (2008). However, these papers do not deal with the issues we are discussing in 
this paper. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the issue of possible conflict 
between income and nutrition based measures of poverty. In the third section we analyze the 
impact of social inequality on pattern of trade and relative price of food in a simple general 
equilibrium framework. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Basic Framework 
We start from two possible axioms as to how perceived social inequality affects individual 
welfare. 
Axiom 1: Inequality hurts. 
This implies that having below average income in a society reduces individual utility. Our 
assumption will be that being above does not matter, but being below definitely hurts. This 
asymmetry is deliberate to highlight the implications of belonging to the downside downside 
of inequality. 
                                                          
1
 Galor and Zeira (1993), Beath and Fitzroy (2007), Mujcic and Frijters (2010), Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) etc. 
have all related individual economic choices to relative status in different contexts. 
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Axiom 2: Inequality increases marginal utility for status good. 
Having lower than average income increases the marginal utility of conspicuous consumption 
or consumption of the status good. This is directly drawn from the experimental psychology 
literature where intensity of desire to consume the status good seems to be greater among 
those who are psychologically affected by social inequality. 
We invoke a simple log linear utility function with N, the consumption of Nutrition good and 
L, the consumption of luxury or status or non-nutrition good. 
𝑈 = 𝑓  
𝑦 
𝑦
  log 𝑁 + 𝜙  
𝑦 
𝑦
 log 𝐿                                                                                              (1)                         
𝑦  is average income of the reference social group. 𝑦 is individual income levels. 
𝑓  
𝑦 
𝑦
   
= 1      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 ≥ 𝑦 
< 1     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 <  𝑦 
                                                                                                          (2) 
and 𝑓 ′ < 0. [Follows from Axiom 1] 
𝜙  
𝑦 
𝑦
   
= 1      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 ≥ 𝑦 
> 1     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 <  𝑦 
                                                                                                         (3) 
and 𝜙′ > 0. [Follows from Axiom 2] 
We shall not discuss price effects at this moment and assume prices to be equal to one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
If inequality hurts, 
𝑓  
𝑦 
𝑦
  log 𝑁 + 𝜙  
𝑦 
𝑦
 log 𝐿  < 𝑓  
𝑦 
𝑦
  log 𝑁0 + 𝜙  
𝑦 
𝑦
 log 𝐿0                                                  (4) 
𝑓, 𝜙 
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𝜙(. ) 
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where (𝑁 , 𝐿 ) are optimal consumption levels for 𝑦 < 𝑦  and (𝑁0, 𝐿0)  are the same for the 
benchmark case with 𝑦 = 𝑦 , i.e. the social average income rises without a decline in 
individual income. 
Invoking the Envelope property it is straightforward to interpret U as 
𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑦
= 𝑓′  −
𝑦 
𝑦2
  log 𝑁 + 𝜙  
𝑦 
𝑦
 log 𝐿  + 𝑓. 𝜙′  −
𝑦 
𝑦2
 log 𝐿 > 0 
or, − 
𝑦 
𝑦2
 𝑓′ log 𝑁 −  
𝑦 
𝑦2
 log 𝐿   𝑓 ′ . 𝜙 + 𝑓. 𝜙′ > 0 
Since 𝑓 ′ < 0 and 𝜙′ > 0, a sufficient condition is given by 
 𝑓 ′ . 𝜙 + 𝑓. 𝜙′ < 0                                                                                                                   (5) 
Note that if  𝑦 moves up the ladder 𝑓(. ) increases but 𝜙 .   drops. Or put differently, if 𝑦 
drops from 𝑦 , 𝑓(. ) goes down to a value less than 1, but 𝜙 .   increases, the net effect has to 
be negative if inequality has to hurt in equilibrium. 
It is obvious that in equilibrium 
𝑁 =
𝑦
1+𝜙
                                                                                                                                   (6) 
We are interested in the level of consumption of 𝑁 as 𝑦 increases from below 𝑦 . Given  
𝑦 
𝑦
 , 
(6) is a very standard outcome. When 𝜙 = 1, by virtue of having this specific utility function,  
𝑁 =
𝑦
2
. However, when 𝜙 > 1 and if both 𝑦 and 𝑦  increase when we increase 𝑦, relative 
social status can worsen leading to an increase in 𝜙 and a net reduction in  𝑁 . 
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝑦
< 0  iff  𝜇𝜎 >
1+𝜙
𝜙
                                                                                                               (7) 
where  𝜇 =
𝑑𝜙
𝑑 
𝑦 
𝑦
 
.
𝑦 
𝑦 
𝜙
 and  𝜎 =
𝑑 
𝑦 
𝑦
 
𝑑𝑦
.
𝑦
𝑦 
𝑦 
. 
As y               𝑦 ,  𝜙  
𝑦 
𝑦
         1, 
1+𝜙
𝜙
  2. 
As y             0  ,  𝜙  
𝑦 
𝑦
         , 
1+𝜙
𝜙
  1. 
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Figure-2 
If  
𝑦 
𝑦
  increases with y, the consumption of N reacts according to the magnitude of 𝜇 and 𝜎. 
While  𝜇  reflects the cultural perception of relative status, 𝜎 reflects the elasticity of 
distribution. If either of them is very weak, we should not have any conflict of measures of 
poverty. If either of them is zero, we are back with the standard case. If either of them is very 
high we shall have our interesting results. Also greater is  
𝑦 
𝑦
  and lower is 1 𝜙  chances are 
greater that the conflict will arise. Inequality has a direct bearing on the nutritional estimate 
of poverty. 
 
3. Extension 
We shall now use the status utility function in a simple general equilibrium framework 
involving two agents A and B and two goods N and L whose interpretations are as same as 
before. Let 𝑃𝑁and 𝑃𝐿 denotes the market prices of the two goods respectively. We assume 
that the two agents enter into the market with fixed endowment of both the goods. Let 
(ΩA
N , ΩA
L ) denote the fixed endowment of goods N and L for consumer A and (ΩB
N , ΩB
L ) denote 
the same for consumer B. Also let 𝑦𝐴 and 𝑦𝐵  denote income of A and B respectively. The 
problem facing the agent 𝑖 is 
max
 𝑁𝑖 ,𝐿𝑖 
      𝑓𝑖  
𝑦 
𝑦𝑖
  log 𝑁𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖  
𝑦 
𝑦𝑖
 log 𝐿𝑖   
0 1 
1 
2
𝜇𝜎, 1 + 1 𝜙  
1 + 1 𝜙  
𝜇𝜎 
 
𝑦 
𝑦
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Subject to the budget constraint 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑖 
where 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 
Simple optimization yields the demand functions: 
𝑁 𝐴 =
𝑦𝐴
(1+𝜙𝐴 )𝑝𝑁
                                                                                                                          (8) 
𝐿 𝐴 =
𝜙𝐴
1+𝜙𝐴
.
𝑦𝐴
𝑝𝐿
                                                                                                                           (9) 
𝑁 𝐵 =
𝑦𝐵
(1+𝜙𝐵 )𝑝𝑁
                                                                                                                       (10) 
𝐿 𝐵 =
𝜙𝐵
1+𝜙𝐵
.
𝑦𝐵
𝑝𝐿
                                                                                                                        (11) 
Now in equilibrium, money income of individual 𝑖  is given by the value of his or her 
endowment. Thus 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑝𝐿Ω𝑖
𝑁 + 𝑝𝑁Ω𝑖
𝐿                                                                                                                (12) 
Let us denote the aggregate excess demand function for the two goods N and L by 𝑧𝑁  and 𝑧𝐿 
respectively. 
By definition of aggregate excess demand function we have, 
 𝑧𝑁 𝑝𝑁 , 𝑝𝐿 = 𝑁 𝐴 + 𝑁 𝐵 − 𝛺𝐴
𝑁 − 𝛺𝐵
𝑁 
                 =
𝑦𝐴
(1 + 𝜙𝐴)𝑝𝑁
+
𝑦𝐵
(1 + 𝜙𝐵)𝑝𝑁
− 𝛺𝐴
𝑁 − 𝛺𝐵
𝑁 
                =
1
(1+𝜙𝐴 )
.
𝑝𝑁𝛺𝐴
𝑁 +𝑝𝐿𝛺𝐴
𝐿
𝑝𝑁
+
1
(1+𝜙𝐵 )
.
𝑝𝑁𝛺𝐵
𝑁 +𝑝𝐿𝛺𝐵
𝐿
𝑝𝑁
− 𝛺𝐴
𝑁 − 𝛺𝐵
𝑁  (13) 
and, 
𝑧𝐿 𝑝𝑁 , 𝑝𝐿 = 𝐿 𝐴 + 𝐿 𝐵 − ΩA
L − ΩB
L  
                   =
𝜙𝐴
1 + 𝜙𝐴
.
𝑦𝐴
𝑝𝐿
+
𝜙𝐵
1 + 𝜙𝐵
.
𝑦𝐵
𝑝𝐿
− 𝛺𝐴
𝐿 − 𝛺𝐵
𝐿  
                  =
𝜙𝐴
1+𝜙𝐴
.
𝑝𝑁𝛺𝐴
𝑁 +𝑝𝐿𝛺𝐴
𝐿
𝑝𝐿
+
𝜙𝐵
1+𝜙𝐵
.
𝑝𝑁𝛺𝐵
𝑁 +𝑝𝐿𝛺𝐵
𝐿
𝑝𝐿
− 𝛺𝐴
𝐿 − 𝛺𝐵
𝐿                                              (14) 
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Let 𝑝𝐿 be the numeraire price. In order to derive the equilibrium relative price we substitute 
𝑝𝐿 = 1  in both in the aggregate excess demand functions and set either (13) or (14) equal to 
zero (assuming that in equilibrium markets clear for both the commodities) and solve for 𝑝𝑁. 
According to Walras’ Law we should get the same equilibrium price no matter which 
equation is solved. 
The equilibrium price of the nutrition good relative to the status good is found to be 
𝑝𝑁
∗ =
Ω𝐴
𝐿   1+𝜙𝐵  + Ω𝐵
𝐿   1+𝜙𝐴  
Ω𝐴
𝑁   1+𝜙𝐵  𝜙𝐴 + Ω𝐵
𝑁   1+𝜙𝐴  𝜙𝐵
                                                                                             (15) 
Let us now move on to explore the possibility of trade between two countries with different 
levels of social inequality. Let the two countries be called country 1 and country 2 
respectively. For simplicity, we also assume that both the countries comprise of only two 
individuals. Let the individuals be denoted by 𝐴1  and 𝐵1  in country 1 and 𝐴2  and 𝐵2  in 
country 2 and let  𝑦𝐴
1 and 𝑦𝐵
1  and 𝑦𝐴
2 and 𝑦𝐵
2 represent their income levels respectively. 
We assume that there is no social inequality in country 1. That is both the individuals have 
same level of income in country. As such, 
𝑦𝐴
1 = 𝑦𝐵
1  
and, 
𝜙𝐴
1 = 𝜙𝐵
1 = 1                                                                                                                         (16) 
Where 𝜙𝐴
1 and 𝜙𝐵
1  denotes the value of 𝜙 of the two individuals in country 1. 
Substituting (16) in (15) we get 
𝑝𝑁
∗1 =
Ω𝐴
𝐿 +Ω𝐵
𝐿
Ω𝐴
𝑁 +Ω𝐵
𝑁                                                                                                                           (17) 
where 𝑝𝑁
∗1 denotes the equilibrium relative price of the nutrition good in country 1. 
Country 2, unlike country 1, is assumed to be affected by social inequality. We assume the 
two individuals have different levels of income with 𝐴2 being “richer” than 𝐵2. That is, 
𝑦𝐴
2 > 𝑦𝐵
2 
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 As such it is straight forward to argue that 
𝜙𝐴
2 = 1 and 𝜙𝐵
2 > 1                                                                                                               (18) 
Where 𝜙𝐴
2 and 𝜙𝐵
2  denotes the value of 𝜙 of the two individuals in country 2. 
By similar substitution as before we obtain the equilibrium relative price in country 2 to be 
𝑝𝑁
∗2 =
𝛺𝐴
𝐿  1+𝜙𝐵
2  +2𝛺𝐵
𝐿
𝛺𝐴
𝑁 1+𝜙𝐵
2  +2𝛺𝐵
𝑁𝜙𝐵
2                                                                                                           (19) 
In order to compare 𝑝𝑁
∗1 and 𝑝𝑁
∗2 we subtract (19) from (17) and simple manipulation yields 
𝑝𝑁
∗1 − 𝑝𝑁
∗2 =  
Ω𝐵
𝑁Ω𝐴
𝐿  𝜙𝐵
2 −1 +Ω𝐵
𝐿 Ω𝐴
𝑁 𝜙𝐵
2 −1 +2Ω𝐵
𝑁Ω𝐵
𝐿  ϕ𝐵
2 −1 
(Ω𝐴
𝑁 +Ω𝐵
𝑁 )[𝛺𝐴
𝑁 1+𝜙𝐵
2  +2𝛺𝐵
𝑁𝜙𝐵
2 ]
> 0    [as 𝜙𝐵
2 > 1]                             (20) 
⇒ 𝑝𝑁
∗1 > 𝑝𝑁
∗2     
which means that equilibrium relative price of the nutrition good is lower in the country with 
greater degree of social inequality other things remaining the same. As such, the magnitude 
of social inequality has a direct effect on relative prices. Therefore following the doctrine of 
“comparative cost”, country 2 which is affected by inequality will export the nutrition good 
and import the luxury good. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been two fold. First, to provide a theoretical explanation behind 
the conflict between nutrition and income based measures of poverty when consumption 
depends on the relative income status. The second motivation has to do with exploring the 
effect of social inequality on the pattern of trade by determining the relative prices in a set up 
where consumption is driven by relative status. The pure exchange general equilibrium model 
deployed identifies the degree of inequality of an economy to have major implication on its 
pattern of trade. 
The log-linear utility function we work with yields standard outcomes when the concern for 
social status is absent. But drastic alterations of results are possible when we introduce the 
idea of relative social status in an otherwise simple utility function. The result on the 
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measurement of poverty obtained by using such a status driven utility function yields a 
theoretical insight towards one of the most worrying consequences of growth. 
The result on the emerging trade pattern is derived in a simple 2x2x2 pure exchange 
framework independent of any other behavioural assumptions using the same log linear status 
driven utility function. Results point out that an economy with more skewed distribution of 
income will export the nutrition good and import the luxury good. The extent of inequality 
thus becomes a determining factor behind “comparative advantage”. A more equitable 
distribution of income worldwide will increase relative food price. 
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